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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation, and TIMPANOGOS
CANAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Case

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
;

vs.
DEE c. HANSEN, as State Engineer of the State of Utah1
'and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Bureau of Reclamation,
Department of the Interior,
Defendants-Respondents,
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation, MBTROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH LAKE
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a cor~oration, KElfllf!COTT COPPBB
CORPOBATION, a,corpor•Fion,
. ·SALT LAKE CITY, a mun!cipal
o
corporation, CElft'RAL UTAH
. WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
'• SCOTT P. WALLACE and RUTQ
·SALLACE, his wife, DAR.REL •· ;
' ebNRAD, VI LATE P. CONRAD 1
'· CHARLES ELMWOOD CONRAD and
ALICE P. CONRAD, his wife,
aad UTAH POWER AND LIGB'l'
COMPANY,
:

'.

..-

Intervenors.
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Jensen
Attorney General
·capitol Building
·-city, Utah a4114
.· •r.l>efendant

e

... 6eet ·.

Courthouse Bldg •

.. .,
Ititervenors
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action both for declaratory judgment and to
review the decision of the State Engineer, Dee C. Hansen,
dated August 9, 1974, relative to Change Application No. a-5433,
filed by Timpanogas Canal Company.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This action was initially filed by plaintiffs-appellants
on October 4, 1974.

(R. 231-248).

The matter was thereafter

submitted to the trial court on December 28, 1977, by Intervenors'
motion to dismiss.

(R. 39-43).

Judge George E. Ballif, after hearing oral arguments granted
defendant-respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice on
March 27, 1978.

(R. 15-19).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants seek to have the District Court's decision
reversed and the case remanded for a determination on the
merits or in the alternative a dismissal without prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Change Application No. a-5433 was filed with the State
Engineer by the appellant, Timpanogas Canal Company, on
February 14, 1968.

(R. 237-246).

The application was filed

to change the point of diversion and nature of the use of 4.0
second feet of water out of a total of 11.29 second feet of
water during the nonirrigation season which had been contracted to Provo City by Timpanogas Canal Company.

(R. 237).

The Change Application was advertised and protests were
lodged by Utah Power and Light Company, Kennecott Copper
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Corporation, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, E.E. and
Alice P. Conrad, Mrs. Warren A. and Darel A. Conrad, Provo River
Water User's Association, Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City, Utah Lake Distributing Company, and United States of
America, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation.
(R.

237).
Hearings were conducted by the State Engineer at Provo,

Utah on September 24, 1968 and February 10 and 11, 1969 and the
defendant, Dee C. Hansen, rendered his Memorandum Decision on
August 9, 1974. (R. 237-239).
The State Engineer, in his memorandum decision, concluded
that the described Change Application should be approved'but
assigned limitations and express conditions to the time, amount,
and use of the water.

( R. 239).

The appellants then filed suit challenging the State Engineer's decision on October 4, 1974.

(R. 231).

alleged four separate causes of action.

The appellants

The first was brought

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 73-3-14 (1953), as a trial de
novo in accordance with the provisions of U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1953).
(R. 231-33).
The Second Cause of Action was brought pursuant to

u.c.A.

78-33-1 (1953) seeking a declaratory judgment that the improvement
of appellants' water system would not adversely affect the rights
of others in the drainage basin, that appellants are the owners
of the waters which they would conserve by changing the distribution system from an earthen canal to a pipeline, and that conditions 1 and 3 of the Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dated August 9, 1974 were beyond the authority of the State
Engineer to impose.

(R. 232-33).

The Third Cause of Action was likewise brought pursuant
to U.C.A. 78-33-1 (1953) and sought a declaratory judgment that
Utah Power & Light Company would suffer no loss of power revenues
due to granting the Change Application, and that condition 4
of the Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer dated August
9, 1974, was beyond the authority of the State Engineer to impose.
(R. 234-235).
The Fourth Cause of Action sought a Declaratory Judgment
that there were no prior rights that needed satisfaction prior
to the appellants' diversion into the proposed system, and that
the State Engineer had no power or authority to impose Condition
5 of the Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer dated
August 9, 1974.
The respondent, Dee C. Hansen answered the complaint on
October 24, 1974.

(R. 222-228).

A motion to intervene was

made by Provo River Water Users Association, Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake City, Utah Lake Distributing Company,
Kennecott Copper Corporation, Salt Lake City, and Central Utah
Conservancy on December 30, 1974.

(R. 209-212).

The pre-trial,

held on January 3, 1975, was therefore occupied primarily with
consideration of the motions to intervene and the appellants'
objections thereto.

(R. 182). The Court after hearing argument

allowed the parties additional time to file memoranda and affidavits supporting their respective positions on the intervention
issue.

(R. 182).
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On January 10, 1975, the Court granted the motions of the
applicants for intervention as defendants but reserved its
ruling on the Motion to Intervene made by Central Utah Water
Conservancy District pending the submission of additional memoranda.

(R. 153-154).

Subsequently, additional parties applied for intervention
on January 23, 1975 (R. 147-148).

These parties, Scott P.

Wallace, Ruth Wallace, Darel A. Conrad, Vilate P. Conrad, Charles
E. Conrad and Alice P. Conrad, had made no previous protest before
the State Engineer contesting the proposed Change Application.
(R. 147, 237).
Intervenors then filed a motion to dismiss and. objection
to the appellants' pre-trial order on January 24, 1975.

The

Intervenors among other things, contended that the order was
premature.

(R. 134-135).

The Court ruled on February 27, 1975, that Central Utah
Conservancy District and the other applicants for intervention
could intervene and file their answers.

(R. 127).

The Court

further held that Utah Power and Light Company and the United
States of America were indispensible parties and ordered the
appellants to join them.

(R. 102, 128).

Appellants filed an Amended Complaint on March 19, 1975.
(R. 103-108).

Answers to the Amended Complaint were filed by

April 15, 1975. (R. 77).
Intervenors filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 29, 1977,
which was granted on March 24, 1978.

(R. 15).
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
73-3-15 TO DISMISS THE ACTION OF PROVO CITY AND TIMPANOGOS
CANAL COMPANY.
The respondents based their Motion to Dismiss on U.C.A.
73-3-15 (1955) which provides that "an action to review a
decision of the State Engineer may be dismissed upon the
application of any of the parties upon the grounds provided
in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the
dismissal of actions generally and for failure to prosecute
such action with diligence."

The statute then states that

"for the purpose of this section failure to prosec~te a suit
to final judgment within two years after it is filed, or, if
an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court within three years
after the filing of the suit, shall constitute lack of
diligence."
It is the appellants' contention that the trial court
misinterpreted this statute and improperly applied it.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Action With

Prejudice.
It is important to note initially that there is no
language in U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1955) that would lend credence
to the supposition that the failure to prosecute an action
to final judgment within the delineated time period warrants,
of necessity, a dismissal of the action with prejudice.

The

statute only establishes the time period which is to be
deemed by the Court to constitute "lack of diligence" under

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

There is no

indication in the statute of any legislative intent to
modify the established rules for determining whether an
action should be dismissed with or without prejudice.

It would

seem that once the court has ferreted out, by use of the two
and three year limitation outlined in the statute, a "lack
of diligence" on the part of one of the parties, the Court
then must determine whether the action should be dismissed
with or without prejudice by using established guidelines
which stand unmodified by U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1955).
Justice Crockett in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v.
Paul W. Larsen Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah, 1975)
stated the guidelines to be employed by the courts in determining whether a cause should be dismissed with or without
prejudice as follows:
. • • It is not to be doubted that in order
to handle the business of the court with efficiency and expedition the trial court should
have a reasonable latitude of discretion in
dismissing for failure to prosecute [citing
cases] if a party fails to move forward
according to the rules and the directions of
the court, without justifiable excuse [citing
cases] . But that prerogative falls short of
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will
result in injustice. Whether there is such
justifiable excuse is to be determined by
considering more factors than merely the
length of time since the suit was filed.
Some consideration should be given to the
conduct of both parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move the case forward
and what they have done about it [citing
cases]; and also what difficulty or prejudice
may have been caused to the other side; and
most important, whether injustice may result
from the dismissal.
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It is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition
in order to keep them up to date.
But it is
even more important to keep in mind that the very
reason for the existence of courts is to afford
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do
justice between them
(Emphasis added)
Westinghouse, supra at 878-9.
Justice Wilkins applied the same guidelines in Polk v.
Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah, 1977) and reversed the decision
of the district court dismissing the plaintiffs' action with
prejudice.
Finally, the Court in Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565
P.2d 1135 (Utah, 1977) listed numerically the guidelines
previously advanced by the Court as:
1. The conduct of both parties.
2.
The opportunity each has had
forward.
3. What each of the parties has
case forward.
4. What difficulty or prejudice
caused to the other side.
5.
And, most important, whether
result from the dismissal.
Utah Oil Company v. Davis, supra, at 1137.

to move the case
done to move the
may have been
injustice may
The court in

Utah Oil Company, Supra, stated explicitly that "where all
of the litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do
so, it is error to dismiss with prejudice."

Utah Oil Co.

v. Harris, supra at 1137.
Although it could conceivably be argued that a trial
court, because of statutory usurpation, does not retain any
discretion to modify the two or three year limitation period
which is outlined in U.C.A 73-3-15 (1955), the trial court
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has never been stripped of its power to dismiss an action
without prejudice by either the legislature or the court.
The only case discussing the statute was Dansie v. Lambert,
542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975), the issue was not raised by the
parties nor discussed by the majority opinion.

The only

mention was by Justice Ellett in a concurring opinion in
which he stated that he would "concur but would add that in
his opinion the Court could have dismissed without prejudice."
Dansie, supra at 744.

There can be no inference from that

statement by Justice Ellett that the majority held that all
cases dismissed under U.C.A. 73-3-15 (1955) must be
with prejudice.

d~smissed

The logical inference from that statement,

since that issue was not before the Court, is simply that
Justice Ellett added that statement as dictum to serve as a
guide for future determinations.
Certainly, in the absence of clear legislative intent,
the Court should not require a manditory dismissal with
prejudice in situations which would not require a dismissal
under Rule 41 U.R.C.P.
helpful.

A simple illustration might be

Under Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P., a party moving for

dismissal must show both inordinate delay and the other
factors outlined in the Westinghouse, supra, before the
action would be dismissed, and even then, the determination
of whether it is to be with or without prejudice is discretionary with the judge.

Under U.C.A 73-3-15, a party moving

for dismissal need only show a failure to bring the action

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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to final judgment in two years and is not required to show
any of the factors outlined in Westinghouse, supra.

To hold

that the cases falling into the latter group must, as a
matter of course, be dismissed with prejudice without
giving the trial court the opportunity to examine the cause
of the delay, the complexity of the case, the amount of harm
caused by the delay and the opportunity of both parties to
advance the case, would be the height of injustice,
especially when a statutory mandate to that effect is
totally lacking.

A fortori,

in matters of this type,

involving public rights, where both sides have equal ability
to advance the case, it is totally unfair to punish one side.
The facts of this case show that the state engineer
took in excess of five years, from February 14, 1968, (the
date Change Application No. a-5433 was filed),

until September

9, 1974, to notice the application, hold the appropriate
hearings and then issue a Memorandum Decision.

(R. 237-246).

The extended amount of time taken by the state engineer
certainly authenticates the plaintiffs' claim relating to
the complexity of the case as it existed before the state
engineer.
The evidential intricacy inherent in the issues of the
case was compounded further by the events occurring after
the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1974.

Despite the

fact that the state engineer promptly answered the complaint
on October 24, 1974 (R. 222-228), and despite the fact that

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the case had been set for a pre-trial conference to be held
on January 3, 1975 (R. 207), the Motions to Intervene made
by twelve new parties (R. 147-149, 209-212), seriously
impeded the tempo of the entire proceeding and complicated
the burden the plaintiff had to bear.
The appellants' contention in this regard is simply
that the trial court erroneously interpreted the statute
(U.C.A. 73-3-15) as mandating a dismissal with prejudice,
and therefore, did not consider or evaluate any of the
factors outlined in Westinghouse, supra.

Although the

appellants concede that the reversal of a dismissal with
prejudice normally requires the court to find an abuse of
discretion by the lower court, the appellants contend that
when the district court has refused to use its discretion,
the court need only find that the district court erroneously
failed to employ its discretion in the matter.
Finally, Utah Code Annotated 73-3-3 (1959) states in
part that:
Any person entitled to the use of water may change
the place of diversion or use and may use the
water for other purposes than those for which it
was originally appropriated, but no such change
shall be made if it impairs any vested right
without just compensation.
If the Court finds that this case should be dismissed
with prejudice, the problem then becomes one of deciding
what issues can be raised in the form of res judicata in a
subsequent case.
Would a dismissal with prejudice operate as an adjudication

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the issue that the proposed change application interefered
with vested rights when the state engineer, in his determination,
found to the contrary?

If another application was submitted

by the appellants changing the point of diversion to an area
six inches down the river from the point designated in the
application involved in this case, would the present case
preclude the approval of such an application?
are endless.

The questions

The fact of the matter is, that this applica-

tion and the issues involved in the case have not been
determined on the merits.

In fact, the dismissal of this

case with prejudice would contradict most of the findings of
the state engineer if it acted as an adjudication of the
validity of the change application.

The facts are that the

state engineer approved the change application and then
assigned certain conditions to his approval.

The engineer,

in effect, found no vested rights that would be damaged
under the terms of his approval.

Under such circumstances

the meaning and effect of a dismissal with prejudice are, to
say the least, tenuous.
It would seem that a better interpretation of the
statute under such facts would be for a dismissal without
prejudice recognizing the problems involved in any other
determination.

After all, the dismissal with its accompanying

loss of time and money is sufficient punishment for a party
not complying with the statute.

-12-
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B.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Plaintiffs'

Complaint in its Entirety.
The amended complaint filed by the appellants in this
case recited four causes of action.

Only the first cause of

action was brought pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated 73-3-14 (1953).

The other three causes of action

were brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-33-1 (1953)
for declaratory judgment. (R.103-118).
The statute forming the basis of the respondent's
motion to dismiss only encompasses those actions brought
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 73-3-14 (1943) to review, by
means of a trial de novo, the decision of the state engineer.
There is no basis in the statute to justify the imposition
of the two and three year limitation on causes of action
that are brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The court therefore erred is dismissing the complaint
in its entirety without making a determination on the factors
outlined in Westinghouse, supra.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
U.C.A. 73-3-15.
The appellants are aware of Dansie v. Lambert, supra,
which characterizes the statute's requirement that any
action brought pursuant to U.C.A. 73-3-14 which is not
brought to final judgment in two years be dismissed as a
manditory requirement.

It is the appellants' contention
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that a statute delineating a time period in which a party
must prosecute a case is very different from a typical
statute of limitations.

Under the latter, a plaintiff can

commence his action without being hindered by any adversary
party and therefore most statutes of limitations have been
interpreted as being reasonable.

But under the former type

of statute the adversary parties are totally free to prolong
the litigation, in effect, depriving the plaintiffs of their
cause of action.
It is only logical that the complexity of a case
coupled with the actions of the adverse parties could easily
carry a case over the two year limitation.

To hold that an

equity court has no ability to modify the limitations period
under those circumstances would impose an unreasonable
restraint on a plaintiff who attempts to pursue his equitable
remedy.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' contention is based on the assumption that
the court misinterpreted the statute (U.C.A. 73-3-15) and
then erroneously dismissed the appelants case without considering and evaluating the guidelines previously announced
by the Court.

The court also erroneously dismissed all of

the appellants' complaint which is tantamount to an
enlargement of the scope of u.c.A. 73-3-15.

Finally, this

case presents the question of whether a court retains the
equitable power to modify the limitations statute when the
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facts so warrant.

It is the appellants position that justice

and equity require the retention of such a power by the court.
Respectfully submitted this

Z<fiAday

of August, 1978.

OWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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